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Abstract 
This study investigates whether agents’ resentment of controls in a gift-exchange 
game can be effectively mitigated using the strategy method where agents’ ef-
fort choices are elicited contingent on all possible contract choices by princip-
als. The results suggest that allowing agents to contemplate contract choices 
prospectively results in less resentment and that agents exert higher effort 
than without this “cooling” process. 
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1. Introduction 
Prior experimental studies documented a hidden cost of controls [1] [2] [3]. In a 
principal-agent setting, this phenomenon occurs when agents’ intrinsically mo-
tivated effort which otherwise would be present in the absence of controls is 
withheld in the presence of controls. This is explained by agents’ resentment due 
to the perception of principals’ choice of controls as a signal of distrust [4]. 
Since it is desirable for principals to maintain controls to align agents’ inter-
ests with their own, it is important to explore ways to mitigate the resentment 
caused by an imposition of controls. Xiao et al. [5] successfully demonstrated 
one mechanism to reduce emotional resentment which resulted in significant 
lower rates of rejections—allowing responders to express their sense of unfair-
ness to proposers in an ultimatum game. Another mechanism, examined by this 
study, provides agents an opportunity to evaluate the situation more carefully 
when controls are chosen in an attempt to “cool” their emotional responses. 
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Brandts et al. [6] conducted a survey study on behavioral differences between 
the direct response method (also called as “Hot” method) and the strategy me-
thod (also called as “Cold” method). In the “Hot” method, the second mover 
responds to the first mover’s observed action while in the “Cold” method, the 
second mover decides on a contingent action for every possible move by the first 
mover without first observing the first mover’s action. While the results on be-
havioral differences between these two elicitation methods are mixed, the tradi-
tional prediction is that players may react more emotionally and less strategically 
when asked “on the spot” in the “Hot” condition than when asked to provide 
decisions for all alternative choices in the “Cold” condition1. 
This study conducts a gift-exchange experiment that investigates whether the 
“Cold” method can be effective in mitigating agents’ resentment when controls 
are chosen by principals. Principals choose between two commonly used con-
tracts in practice: a trust contract (an example of fixed wage contract) in which 
principals have no controls over agents’ effort and a control contract (an exam-
ple of implicit contract) in which principals can use a punishment if agents fail 
to provide the desired effort. Two treatments are administrated. The Hot treat-
ment uses the direct response method to elicit agents’ effort choices, whereas the 
Cold treatment uses the strategy method to elicit agents’ effort choices. 
The results support the traditional prediction, in that when principals choose 
the control contract agents exert higher effort in the Cold treatment than the 
Hot treatment. These results suggest that the hypothetical elicitation of decisions 
“forces” agents to think through both contracts more carefully. This process ap-
pears to “cool down” their resentful emotions of controls resulting in higher ef-
fort as compared to when they lack this opportunity and their responses are eli-
cited “on the spot”. 
While prior studies found no behavioral differences in an ultimatum game 
[7], a trust game [8] and a public goods game [9],this study adds to the literature 
collected in the survey study of [6] by examining a gift-exchange game. In addi-
tion, this study sheds light on the potential usefulness of a “cooling” mechanism 
for managers in effectuating controls. Finally, the study discusses interpretations 
of the findings and suggestions for future research on exploring the determi-
nants of behavioral differences between these two methods. 
2. Method 
This study employs two contracts which are both based on a gift-exchange game 
[10]. In the trust contract, in stage 1, the principal offers a wage w and requests a 
desired effort level eˆ , where { }ˆ 0.1, ,1e∈  . In stage 2, in return the agent se-
lects an effort, e, where { }0.1, ,1e∈  . The principal’s earnings are e(120 – w). 
The agent’s earnings are w – c(e), where c(e) is the cost of effort to the agent. 
The relationship between effort and costs is shown below: 
 
 
1A complete discussion on the behavioral difference between the strategy method and direct re-
sponse method can be found in [6]. 
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e 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
 
In the control contract, the first and second stage are identical to those in the 
fixed wage contract. After stage 2, a third stage was added, in which the principal 
had an option to punish the agent at a cost of 2 if the agent’s actual effort is low-
er than the desired effort. It is costless if the principal decides not to punish. 
When the punishment is chosen, it reduces the agent’s payoff by 6. Assuming 
individuals only care about their own payoff, the equilibrium strategy under 
both contracts is for the principals to offer w = 20 and the agents’ best response 
is to choose e = 0.1, and eˆ  is not payoff relevant. 
Two treatments were conducted. In the Hot treatment, the principal decides 
which contract to offer. The agent chooses effort after learning the principal’s 
contract choice. In contrast, in the Cold treatment, the agent chooses effort be-
fore learning the principal’s contract choice contingent on both contracts being 
offered. 
The Hot treatment consisted of 5 sessions with 130 total participants. The 
Cold treatment consisted of 2 sessions with 40 total participants. All participants 
were undergraduate volunteers from The Ohio State University. In all treat-
ments principals and agents are re-matched after each period and interacted for 
ten periods. The experiments were computerized, using z-Tree [11]. The time-
line of decisions is shown in Figure 1. Both the Hot and the Cold treatment be-
gin with the principal choosing to offer either a trust contract or a control con-
tract. Next, the principal offers a wage and requests a desired effort level. In re-
sponse, the agent chooses an effort level. If a control contract is offered, the 
principal then decides whether to use a punishment, while if a trust contract is 
offered, no punishment is allowed. The only difference between the two treat-
ments is that in the Hot treatment the agent makes only one effort choice after 
observing the principal’s contract choice, whereas in the Cold treatment the 
agent makes two contingent effort choices before observing the principal’s con-
tract choice. 
The focus of this study is on a comparison of agents’ effort in the Hot treat-
ment and agents’ effort in the Cold treatment when principals choose the con-
trol contract. Higher agents’ effort in the Cold treatment than the Hot treatment 
would suggest that agents’ resentment of controls appears to be mitigated when 
they are given an opportunity to “cool down” and think through principals’ 
contract choices. 
3. Results 
The main results are presented as follows. 
RESULT 1. When principals choose the control contract, agents’ effort and 
principals’ payoffs are higher in the Cold treatment than in the Hot treatment. 
Summary statistics are found in Table 1. Average effort in the Cold treatment 
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when control is chosen is 0.4, while in the Hot treatment the average effort is 
0.35 (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.01). Additionally the principals’ 
earnings in the Cold treatment when control is chosen are on average 28 and are 
significantly higher than that in the Hot treatment, with average earnings of 24 
(Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.01). 
Figure 2 presents agents’ effort partitioned by wage offers. The significant 
difference in agents’ effort between the Cold and Hot treatment is mainly found 
for medium wage offers (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.01). For low wage 
offers there is no expectation of reciprocity in either condition and for high wage 
offers there are insufficient observations. 
These results suggest that the hypothetical elicitation of decisions “forces” 
agents to think through both contracts more carefully. This process appears to 
“cool down” their resentful emotions resulting in higher effort as compared to 
when they lack this opportunity and their responses are elicited “on the spot.” 
Additionally, it is helpful to understand whether this “cooling effect” is more 
pronounced in the early or late periods. In this experiment, subjects played for 
ten periods. If the “cooling effect” occurs, it is expected to be stronger as subjects 
gain more experience. The evidence is provided as follows. 
RESULT 2. When principals choose the control contract, the difference in 
agents’ effort between the Hot treatment and the Cold treatment mainly occurs 
in the later periods. 
 
 
Figure 1. Timeline of decisions. 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics mean (Standard deviation). 
 Hot Treatment Cold Treatment 
 Control Contract Trust Contract Control Contract Trust Contract 
 47 56 44 48 
Wage (16) (24) (16) (21) 
Agent’s Effort 0.35 0.34 0.4 0.28 
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.22) 
Principal’s Payoffs 24 20 28 19 
 (18) (15) (18) (14) 
Agent’s Payoffs 41 52 37 45 
 (15) (22) (15) (19) 
Number of Observations 583 67 154 46 
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Figure 2. Agent’s effort across treatments. 
 
Figure 3 presents agents’ effort over time. The figure reveals that in the first 
three periods when principals choose the control contract, agents’ effort is al-
most identical between the Cold and the Hot treatment. Moreover, from the 
fourth period, agents’ effort in the Cold treatment starts to exceed the effort in 
the Hot treatment (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.02 in period 8 and p = 
0.09 in period 10). One plausible interpretation is that, as agents gain experience 
with making contingent effort choices in the Cold treatment, repeated oppor-
tunities to “cool off” may help agents react even less emotionally in the later pe-
riods. By contrast, agents put “on the spot” may have difficulty making unemo-
tional decisions even when doing so repeatedly. 
4. Discussion 
This study finds that the strategy method can be a “cooling down” mechanism to 
mitigate agents’ emotional resentment of controls. Despite the fact that there is 
no clear consensus in theories about the determinants on when these two me-
thods are different, this study provides additional evidence to support a predic-
tion in the prior literature that subjects react less emotionally, and potentially 
more strategically, when asked to respond to multiple alternative choices in the 
strategy method than the direct response method. 
[1] found no significant difference in agents’ effort in a gift-exchange game 
between these two methods. In their study, principals can impose a control 
which restricts agents’ strategy space. It is possible that their control is so intru-
sive that it can be clearly interpreted as a strong signal of distrust by agents even 
when the strategy method is applied. However, the control this study employed 
is inherently much less intrusive than the control in [1] because it does not re-
strict agents’ strategy space and principals retain the option not to use it. A con-
trol of this type is more likely to appear legitimate to agents when they have the 
opportunity to consider it carefully, resulting in less emotional resentment. 
Therefore, this study’s “Cold” elicitation method is likely to be more effective in 
reducing agents’ negative responses to controls than the one in [1]. 
This suggests that the behavioral differences between these two elicitation  
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Figure 3. Agent’s effort by periods. 
 
methods may depend on how strongly agents’ emotions are aroused by the ex-
perimental manipulation. If the emotion is too strong, it is likely that the strate-
gy method is inadequate to mitigate the emotional reaction. Likewise, if the 
emotion is weak, it is likely that the strategy method can be helpful to suppress 
it. Future research could manipulate the strength of emotions and explore 
whether it affects behavioral differences between these two methods. 
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